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COMMENT
PRISON, MONEY, AND DRUGS: THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING SYSTEM MUST BE
MORE CRITICAL IN BALANCING PRIORITIES
BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE
By: Whitley Zachary
ABSTRACT
America is currently facing a major crisis with prison overcrowding
and operating costs that exceed the annual budget.  In the 1980s, the
federal government began a “war on drugs” and Congress passed a
number of drug statutes that carried mandatory minimum penalties for
offenders.  Since then, the federal prison population began to grow ex-
ponentially and has now reached a practically unsustainable level.  The
marginal changes made thus far are simply not enough to address the
problem.
Since 1984, the federal sentencing system has struggled to efficiently
and effectively balance mandatory minimum sentences with the sentenc-
ing guidelines.  Mandatory minimum sentences should be abolished,
and all authority transferred to the Sentencing Commission.  The Com-
mission needs to comprehensively reevaluate and reformulate all sen-
tencing guidelines free from the control of the mandatory sentences.
Nevertheless, a complete reform of the sentencing system will take
quite some time and more immediate relief is necessary.  In the interest
of alleviating the strain of the prison population and its costs, the Com-
mission and Congress need to first eliminate the mandatory sentences
for drug offenses and begin developing alternatives to incarceration for
those whose offenses do not warrant imprisonment or who are in need
of treatment.
The Comment discusses the federal sentencing system and how
mandatory minimum sentences spurred by the “war on drugs” have
created a culture of incarceration that cannot be sustained by prison
facilities or budgets.  The sentencing system needs comprehensive re-
form that eradicates mandatory minimums and values treatment as well
as punishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The prison population in America is the largest in the world.1
While making up only 5% of the world’s population, America ac-
counts for nearly 25% of the world’s prison population.2  Federal pris-
ons cost billions of dollars a year, and costs continue to rise.3  Half of
all federal prisoners are serving sentences for drug offenses.4  Many
aspects of the federal sentencing system are complicated and difficult
1. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0.
2. Id.
3. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 82 (Oct. 2011),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory
-minimum-penalties/report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminal-
justice-system [hereinafter 2011 REPORT].
4. Statistics, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2014).
2014] PRISON, MONEY, AND DRUGS 325
to understand, but the fact that there is something drastically wrong
with this picture is not one of them.5
In 1984, after ten years of careful consideration and debate, the fed-
eral government introduced the Sentencing Reform Act.6  Congress
decided on two different approaches: creating a dual sentencing sys-
tem made up of sentencing guidelines promulgated by an expert com-
mission and mandatory minimum sentencing statutes.7  The
coexistence of these two sentencing schemes has been less than ideal,
resulting in an overly complex system and mass incarceration.8
Since the 1980s, Congress has emphasized harsh mandatory
sentences, particularly for drug offenses.9  As a result of this “war on
drugs,” federal prisons began to fill up with drug offenders facing long
sentences.10  Unfortunately, a large majority of these prisoners were
low-level drug offenders rather than the major traffickers and king-
pins that the federal government was intent on defeating.11  Over
time, several changes have been made to the laws and policies of the
criminal justice system in the search for fairness and justice.12  Yet
still, harsh drug laws continue to punish many more low-level offend-
ers than kingpins while the massive prison population drains govern-
ment funds.13
This Comment will discuss how dire circumstances in the federal
criminal justice system require radical reform in order to produce nec-
essary and timely results.  Part II will look at the two components of
the federal sentencing system: the sentencing guidelines and the
mandatory minimum sentences.  Part III will discuss how the national
5. See Erik S. Siebert, Comment, The Process is the Problem: Lessons Learned
from United States Drug Sentencing Reform, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (2010).
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16
(Aug. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 REPORT].
7. Id. at 8.
8. Siebert, supra note 5, at 867.
9. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAG-
MIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 1 (2007).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 12.
12. Siebert, supra note 5, at 868.  (addressing eight major changes in the article:
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; Sentencing Guide-
lines of 1987; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994; Feeney Amendment of 2003; and Judicial Sentencing Reform).
13. Role Adjustment of Drug Offenders in Each Drug Type, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, http://isb.ussc.gov/content/pentaho-cdf/RenderXCDF?solution=Sourcebook
&path=&action=table_xx.xcdf&template=mantle&table_num=Table40 (2012); Mag-
gie E. Harris, Comment, The Cost of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 14 FL. COASTAL
L. REV. 419, 420 (2013) (“Prison budgets have grown into the billions while legisla-
tures have cut important state funding budgets for education, healthcare, and infra-
structure.”); Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying
the Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 951 (2001) (“Pro-
grams unrelated to the criminal justice system have had their budgets slashed as
prison budgets grow.”).
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prison population, and the huge expense at which it comes, is dispro-
portionately due to low-level drug offenders.  Part IV will review re-
cent and proposed legislation aimed at improving this inefficient
system, as well as shifts in policy directives.  Part V will propose a
possible approach to timely and comprehensive reform of the federal
sentencing system.
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
The United States has long struggled with the federal sentencing
system and, unfortunately, the struggle continues.14  As recently as the
1980s, the United States had an indeterminate system, meaning multi-
ple governmental bodies shared the responsibilities inherent in sen-
tencing.15  Congress defined a maximum; judges imposed a sentence
according to that maximum; and the parole board decided when a de-
fendant had served enough of that sentence.16  Congress assigned only
the maximum time that could be sentenced for a specific offense.17
Judges would consider all relevant facts and circumstances in a case to
determine what the actual sentence should be, ranging anywhere from
fines or probation to the upward maximum set by Congress.18  Once
the defendant had served a certain portion of the assigned sentence
(usually around a third of the sentence) the parole board could then
decide whether they should be paroled or released early for good
behavior.19
During that time, the primary focus of the American criminal jus-
tice system was the rehabilitation of offenders, and prisons were ex-
pected to further that purpose.20  However, people began to lose faith
in the rehabilitative system, and the focus of sentencing shifted to a
retribution theory.21  Retribution theory relies on the premise that if
sentences will be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime offend-
ers will be deterred from committing more serious crimes.22  Along
with this shift in focus came a general disfavor for the vast discretion
of judges to give lenient sentences and the power of parole boards to
release prisoners before their sentences were fully served.23  Propo-
14. Siebert, supra note 5, at 918 (“The powers behind sentencing reform have en-
gaged in a twenty-five year struggle to alter the federal drug sentencing laws. . . [u]ntil
the previous message or a rational substitute takes its place, further stagnation is on
the horizon.”).
15. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7–8.
16. Mascharka, supra note 13, at 940.
17. Id.
18. Siebert, supra note 5, at 869.
19. Id.
20. RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A
WORKABLE SYSTEM 5 (2013).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Siebert, supra note 5, at 869–71; ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 4 (1987).
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nents for a determinate system of sentencing believed that “wide-open
judicial discretion and parole actually exacerbated the problems of
controlling crime.”24
A. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act,
which included the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”).25  The SRA
provided for the development of sentencing guidelines that would fur-
ther the basic purposes of criminal punishment.26  In addition to iden-
tifying the basic purposes of punishment as deterrence, incapacitation,
just punishment, and rehabilitation, the SRA outlined three major
objectives:
(1) to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to com-
bat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system;
(2) to establish reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrow-
ing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal of-
fenses committed by similar offenders; and
(3) to create proportionality in sentencing through a system that
imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of
differing severity.27
More concisely, the goal of the SRA was to increase consistency
and reduce disparity in the federal sentencing system.28
In addition to creating a uniform system, the SRA abolished parole
to create honesty in sentencing.29  Originally, parole boards were uti-
lized to assess prisoners and their state of rehabilitation, as well as
control prison populations and overcrowding.30  The parole board’s
role in determining sentence length was becoming unpopular because
it added to the inequality of sentence length for similar offenders.31
Ideally, the existence of guidelines and structure in sentencing would
render the parole boards unnecessary.32  The new guidelines were de-
signed to directly control the prison populations beginning at the sen-
tencing stage.33
Effectively throwing out the indeterminate system, the SRA dele-
gated authority to the Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), an in-
dependent and permanent body whose principal focus was the
24. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
25. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 2 VOL. 1, at 1
(2013) [hereinafter USSG MANUAL].
27. Sentencing Reform Act, 98 Stat. 1987.
28. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 9.
29. USSG MANUAL, supra note 26, at 2–3.
30. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 69.
31. USSG MANUAL, supra note 26, ch. 1, pt. A(i)(3).
32. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 12.
33. FRASE, supra note 20, at 9.
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sentencing system.34  The Commission was responsible for creating
sentencing guidelines that would reflect the new stated purposes of
the sentencing system.35  The Commission would also study past prac-
tices, review implementation of the guidelines, and refine the guide-
lines after evaluation.36  Additionally, the Commission would
complete periodical reviews and submit reports to Congress.37
Through this evolutionary and systematic approach, the Commission
could ensure that the guidelines would be effective and achieve the
intended results.38  Lastly, the Commission was expected to advise
Congress about any relevant sentencing issues.39
After the Commission was appointed in 1985, it issued the first set
of guidelines in April 1987.40  In developing these initial guidelines,
the Commission conducted extensive hearings, deliberated, and con-
sidered a substantial amount of public comments.41  They were imme-
diately challenged as unconstitutional, though the Supreme Court
upheld their constitutionality in Mistretta v. United States.42  Although
the guidelines were originally mandatory, they were designed to pro-
vide structure in sentencing rather than to replace judicial discretion
entirely.43  The Commission intended for the guidelines to be used in
all ordinary circumstances to produce consistently appropriate
sentences.44  In extraordinary circumstances, a judge could deviate
from the guidelines but would be required to provide an explanation
for why it was justified.45
In 2005, the Supreme Court found the mandatory nature of the
guidelines to be unconstitutional in United States v. Booker.46  The
guidelines were established as advisory from that point forward.47
Eliminating the mandatory nature of the guidelines would protect
judges from being reversed simply for handing down a sentence not
within the sentencing range set by the Commission.48  The Court felt
that an advisory guideline system would “continue to move sentencing
in Congress’ preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing
34. Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
35. USSG MANUAL, supra note 26, at 1.
36. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 7.
37. 2012 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANN. REP. 10 [hereinafter 2012 REPORT].
38. Id. at 2, 10.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Siebert, supra note 5, at 873.
41. USSG MANUAL, supra note 26, at 2.
42. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
43. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25; VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 8.
44. VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 8–9.
45. Id.
46. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); USSG MANUAL, supra note 26,
at 12.
47. Booker, 543 U.S. at 247.
48. Siebert, supra note 5, at 907.
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disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize
sentences where necessary.”49
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
While the Commission was being established, Congress passed the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“ADAA”).50  Through this Act, Con-
gress reintroduced mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.51
Consequently, the Commission had to carefully write its guidelines in
compliance with the sentences mandated by Congress.52  Neverthe-
less, if a situation arose where the guidelines conflicted with a statu-
tory sentence, the statute would control.53
As a response to public demand and fear from a perceived “crack
epidemic,” the ADAA established mandatory minimum sentences for
offenses concerning commonly abused drugs.54  The ADAA created a
tiered system with minimum sentences assigned to the particular type
and quantity of the drug involved.55  Subsequently, Congress contin-
ued to pass statutes with mandatory minimum sentences at an alarm-
ing rate, and sixty were in place by 1991.56  While these new statutes
covered a broader range of offenses, Congress seemed focused prima-
rily on drug offenses.57  Of the sixty statutes passed, only four had
frequent convictions, which were for drug- or weapon-related of-
fenses.58  The use of mandatory minimum sentences signified a shift
away from the rehabilitative model, heading toward retribution as a
main objective.59
C. Overlap and Conflict
While mandatory minimum sentences are not a new phenomenon,
it is surprising how quickly Congress was willing to reintroduce
them.60  This surprise is amplified by the fact that the federal govern-
ment previously used mandatory minimums specifically targeting drug
crimes, but they were repealed for ineffectiveness.61  In the 1950s,
Congress attempted to deter drug-related crimes with severe
49. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65.
50. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); Siebert, supra
note 5, at 871–73.
51. Siebert, supra note 5, at 872.
52. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 115.
53. Id.
54. Mascharka, supra note 13, at 941.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 942; 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
57. Mascharka, supra note 13 at 941; Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No.
100-690(a), 102 Stat. 4377 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 863 (1994)).
58. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 10–11.
59. 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
60. Id. at 23–24.
61. Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety
Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1851 (1995).
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mandatory penalties created by the Narcotic Control Act.62  Ulti-
mately, these laws were considered unacceptable because the results
were unjust and unsuccessful.63  Then in 1970, Congress repealed the
drug-related mandatory minimum penalties almost entirely in pursuit
of more just and appropriate sentencing.64  Congress should have
been more wary of reenacting this type of statute, not to mention as
hastily as it did.65
The Sentencing Commission’s guideline system and the mandatory
minimum sentencing system have always coexisted and technically do
not interfere with each other.66  Unfortunately, the Commission and
guidelines have never been able to operate as initially designed by
Congress.67  Because Congress passed the ADAA before the Com-
mission finished its initial set of guidelines, those mandatory minimum
sentences had to be incorporated as the baseline for other sentences.68
The ADAA and other statutory penalties affected the entire develop-
ment of the initial set of guidelines.69
Congress specifically gave the Commission the authority to recom-
mend sentencing modifications that the Commission found necessary
“to carry out an effective, humane, and rational sentencing policy.”70
Accordingly, the Commission has continually discussed mandatory
minimums and their effectiveness in reports to Congress.71  The Com-
mission has consistently advised Congress that the guidelines alone
would be more effective than keeping them both in place.72  Because
the Commission cannot tell Congress to discard the mandatory
sentences, the secondary recommendation is that if Congress does de-
cide to enact statutes with mandatory minimum sentences, those
sentences should: “(1) not be excessively severe, (2) be narrowly tai-
62. 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
63. Oliss, supra note 61, at 1851–52.
64. Id. at 1852; 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
65. Mascharka, supra note 13, at 939 (“In 1970, Congress responded to the con-
cerns of prosecutors, wardens, and families of those convicted, repealing virtually all
provisions imposing mandatory minimum sentences for drug violations.  Congress
commented that lengthening prison sentences ‘had not shown the expected overall
reduction in drug law violations.’” (footnote omitted)); Mary Price, Everything Old is
New Again: Fixing Sentencing by Going Back to First Principles, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 75, 80 (“The House Judiciary Committee passed the laws
in less than one week, without hearings, debate, or study.”).
66. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
67. Oliss, supra note 61, at 1892.
68. Siebert, supra note 5, at 872.
69. Mascharka, supra note 13, at 942 (describing the interference as an early “no
confidence vote” in the Commission and its forthcoming guidelines).
70. 2012 REPORT, supra note 37, at 7.
71. Id. See also 2011 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1; 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at
62–63.
72. 2012 REPORT, supra note 37, at 7, 18; 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 61; 1991
REPORT, supra note 6, at 121–23.
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lored to apply only to those offenders who warrant such punishment,
and (3) be applied consistently.”73
Nevertheless, since the 1980s Congress has defended the presence
of mandatory minimum penalties in the federal sentencing system.74
It is doubtful that these mandatory sentences are either less than
overly severe or narrowly tailored enough to only apply when such
punishment is warranted.75  In any case, it is apparent that in the last
thirty years the federal government has failed to construct a coherent
and efficient sentencing system, but not for lack of trying.76
To the contrary, Congress has micromanaged the Commission and
prevented it from making significant changes to streamline the federal
sentencing scheme.77  Since 1991, the Commission has repeatedly pro-
posed alternatives and changes to the mandatory minimum sentencing
system, including reducing disparities, but Congress has punted on sig-
nificant action.78  The entanglement of mandatory minimums and sen-
tencing guidelines has only been further complicated by every change
made by Congress along the way.79 Congress regularly orders the
Commission to incorporate changes to mandatory minimums regard-
ing length, criteria, and safety valves, but fails to address the funda-
mental flaws with the system.80
The coexistence of mandatory minimum sentences and the sentenc-
ing guidelines is exhausting and complicated. Fortunately, the original
motive behind leaving it up to a Sentencing Commission to implement
insightful, well-designed guidelines is as promising today as it was
thirty years ago.81 But impulsive congressional enactment of
mandatory minimum sentences has overpowered the federal sentenc-
73. 2012 REPORT, supra note 37, at 19.
74. Id. at 18–19; 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 57–61. See also Douglas A.
Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and
Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 100 (1999) (noting that
the SRA’s passage began a pattern of Congress rejecting the Commission’s continued
attempts to relax mandatory sentencing’s role because lawmakers “do[ ] not trust the
Commission and the judiciary to develop an effective and just sentencing scheme on
their own. More tangibly and troublesomely, these laws limit the ability and skew the
efforts of the Commission and the judiciary to take full advantage of their special
institutional capacities to develop the best possible sentencing guideline system.”).
75. 2012 REPORT, supra note 37, at 19.
76. Siebert, supra note 5, at 867–68.
77. Price, supra note 65, at 85–86 (Congress has been “intimately involved in influ-
encing sentencing guideline amendments” and has passed “a series of ‘directives’ to
the Commission telling where and how to amend the guidelines.”).
78. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 121–27; see 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at
345–69.
79. See generally, Oliss, supra note 61, at 1882.
80. Id. at 1888.
81. Price, supra note 65, at 92–93.  USSC Reports to Congress continue to express
“belief[s] that a strong and effective sentencing guidelines system best serves the pur-
poses of the Sentencing Reform Act.”  2012 REPORT, supra note 37, at 7.
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ing system.82  Congress needs to take a step back and allow the Com-
mission to take over.  The Commission has suggested alternative ways
for Congress to develop a better system without resorting to
mandatory minimum statutes.83  Because this complicated dual system
is not likely to ever succeed, these statutes should be repealed and the
Commission given a chance to operate as intended.84
III. PRISON, MONEY, AND DRUGS
Basic issues of public policy require that sentencing be carried out
in a way that is clear and justified.85  However, it hardly seems justifia-
ble that the U.S. prison population has increased  almost seven-fold
since 1970.86  These unprecedented numbers, along with the devastat-
ing cost of sustaining them, should more than evidence that it is time
to reevaluate whom we lock up and for how long.87  As a nation,
America has the harshest sentencing practices and highest incarcera-
tion rates in the world.88  Although the United States is home to less
than 5% of the world’s population, it incarcerates almost 25% of the
world’s prisoners.89
A. Mass Incarceration
America’s prison population began to rapidly increase in the late
1970s as a tough-on-crime movement began to gain momentum.90
Prior to this initiative, the country’s incarceration rates were similar to
those of other major industrialized nations.91  In its wake, the national
incarceration rate is 751 prisoners per 100,000 people, while the world
median is only 125 prisoners for every 100,000 people.92
The incarceration rate is not the only relevant factor into the mas-
sive prison population; the length of prison sentences also plays an
82. Oliss, supra note 61, at 1878.  Even though mandatory minimum statutes were
essentially incorporated into the guidelines, they often trump the guidelines where
there is a difference and call for harsher sentences than the guidelines would in a
particular situation.  Price, supra note 65, at 91.
83. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 127.
84. See Mascharka, supra note 13, at 974–75; Price, supra note 65, at 92–93. See
also Steven Nauman, Note, Brown v. Plata: Renewing the Call to End Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing, 65 FLA. L. REV. 855, 883–84 (2013).
85. FRASE, supra note 20, at 81; 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 17–18.
86. FRASE, supra note 20, at 5.
87. Id.
88. Liptak, supra note 1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; Jon Fasman, Why Does America Have Such a Big Prison Population?,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/08/economist-explains-8.
92. Id.  Russia’s rate is closest at 627 prisoners for every 100,000 people, while
England’s is 151, Germany’s is 88, and Japan’s is 63. Id.
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important role.93  The national rate at which inmates are being admit-
ted into prisons is actually lower than some European countries, but
total incarceration continues to be so much higher in America due to
its much longer prison sentences.94
A major source of both the elevated number of prisoners and in-
creased sentence length is the passionately fought “war on drugs.”95
To control illegal drugs, the federal criminal justice system has focused
on harsh punishments for drug offenders.96  In 1980, jails and prisons
across the country housed about 40,000 drug offenders.97  Today, the
number of inmates in jails and prisons across the country for drug
crimes has grown to almost 500,000, more than ten times higher.98
The incarceration pandemic plaguing the U.S. as a whole is strongly
represented in the federal criminal justice system specifically.99  The
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has more than 200,000 total inmates and
is exceeding capacity by 38%.100  Similar to the nationwide growth
spurt, the federal inmate population doubled in the 1980s from 24,000
to 58,000 and continued to rise at alarming rates in the years follow-
ing.101  As the BOP receives more new inmates than it releases every
year, overcrowding is only expected to worsen.102
B. The Cost of Incarceration
While the prison population alone should be enough to provoke re-
form, the cost of mass incarceration is particularly vexing.103  Across
the country, prisons and jails drained almost $60 billion in 2012
alone.104  Annual BOP operations costs are constantly rising, having
93. See 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 115–17.  Since 1990, there has been a 36%
increase in the average length of prison sentences in the U.S.  Rachel Myers, Extreme
Sentencing, ACLU, Aug. 13, 2012, https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/ex-
treme-sentencing (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
94. Liptak, supra note 1.
95. Id.
96. See id.; 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 72–73.
97. MAUER & KING, supra note 9, at 2.
98. Id.
99. Fasman, supra note 91.
100. Statistics, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population
_statistics.jsp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Statistics]; REPORT FROM THE
CRIMINAL DIVISION TO THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5
(July 23, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/2012-annual-let-
ter-to-the-us-sentencing-commission.pdf (annual report commenting on the operation
of the sentencing guidelines, suggesting changes in the guidelines that appear to be
warranted, and otherwise assessing the Commission’s work as required by the SRA)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL DIVISION REPORT].
101. Statistics, supra note 100;, 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 118.
102. 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 83.
103. Mascharka, supra note 13, at 949 (Not only has it cost billions to construct
enough prisons to house the prisoners, but also the annual cost of a federal inmate is
approximately $24,000.).
104. Why Should I Care?, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, http://
famm.org/sentencing-101/the-facts/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
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increased from $1.3 billion in 1991 to over $6 billion by 2010.105  Cur-
rently, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) devotes a quarter of its
budget to incarcerating offenders.106  This seems particularly impru-
dent considering that half of BOP inmates are nonviolent drug
offenders.107
Regrettably, the growing prison costs reduce the budget allocations
in other important areas, like crime-fighting personnel and equip-
ment.108  According to a DOJ report, “the trend of greater prison
spending crowding out other criminal justice investments dates back
at least a decade and has caused significant redistribution of discre-
tionary funding among the Department’s various activities.”109  In
2012, the DOJ had to reduce funding for state, local, and tribal justice
assistance programs to 8% of its budget, dropping those funds to their
lowest level in the past fifteen years.110  This decrease in available
funds is directly related to the increase in the costs of incarceration.111
C. Prominence in Drug Offenses
The incarceration surge of the 1980s was jump–started by the SRA
and the reintroduction of mandatory minimums, demonstrating the
focus on the “war on drugs”.112  Drug arrests have more than tripled
in the last twenty-five years, with a record high of 1.8 million arrests in
2005.113  During the 1990s, 79% of the growth in drug arrests was at-
tributable solely to marijuana possession.114
Unfortunately, exponential growth occurred in incarceration as well
as arrests: the national number of inmates locked up for drug offenses
in prison or jail has increased 1,100% since 1980.115  Currently, drug
offenders account for just under 50% of the federal inmate popula-
105. Id.; 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 83.
106. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Justice, Sci. & Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 8
(2013) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)
[hereinafter Statements].
107. THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, SENTENCING
PROJECT 1 (2004), http:\\www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_federal
prisonpop.pdf.
108. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT TO THE U.S. SEN-






112. A Storied Past, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/history/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2014); Liptak, supra note 1.
113. MAUER & KING, supra note 9, at 2 (“Nearly a half-million (493,800) persons
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tion.116  That is a total of nearly 100,000 persons serving drug
sentences in federal prison.117  Due to the combined effect of
mandatory minimum sentencing and the abolition of parole, drug of-
fenders are serving much longer sentences than before.118  Drug of-
fenders served an average sentence of twenty-two months in 1986, but
are now serving an average of sixty-two months.119
Even with recent amendments and increased exceptions, the pres-
ence of mandatory minimum sentences in drug offenses remains
strong.120  In 2010, two out of every three defendants whose convic-
tion carried a mandatory minimum penalty were in fact drug offend-
ers.121  Of those drug offenders, half of the mandatory minimum
sentences they were subject to were ten-year penalties.122  In light of
these numbers, the Commission believes that the mandatory penalties
are more far-reaching than Congress intended them to be.123
D. Effects on Society
Unfortunately, the effects of mass incarceration cannot be restricted
to the offenders and taxpayer dollars alone.124  Incarceration, espe-
cially for extremely long sentences, has a devastating effect on the
families of inmates.125  One in every twenty-eight children has an in-
carcerated parent, yielding an estimated 1.7 million minor children in
2007.126  Incarcerated drug offenders are more likely than violent of-
fenders to have minor children.127  Tragically, almost 70% of parents
in federal prisons were the primary source of financial support for
their children at the time they were arrested.128  Not only do these
children have to face the obstacles of growing up with that parent ab-
sent, but also the cost of raising them has to be redirected to other
sources.129
116. Statistics, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_
inmate_offenses.jsp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
117. See 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 268.
118. MAUER & KING, supra note 9, at 7.
119. Id. at 8.
120. See 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 268 (In 2010, more than half of the drug
offenders incarcerated in the BOP were subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at
sentencing.).
121. Id. at 261.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 262.
124. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 13, at 433 (Lengthy prison sentences “are not only
costly to taxpayers but also to the families of inmates.”). See also Nauman, supra note
84, at 877.
125. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PAR-
ENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 4–5 (2008).
126. See id. at 1.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 17.
129. SUSAN D. PHILLIPS & JAMES P. GLEESON, CENTER FOR SOCIAL POLICY &
RESEARCH, CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2–4 (2007).
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The downfalls of this system do not go unnoticed either.  More than
half of Americans report that they oppose mandatory minimum
sentences for nonviolent crimes and that they value preventing recidi-
vism over requiring incarceration.130  Families Against Mandatory
Minimums report that 84% of Americans also agree that “some of the
money that we are spending on locking up low-risk, nonviolent in-
mates should be shifted to strengthening community corrections pro-
grams like probation and parole.”131
Furthermore, a large number of drug offenders also have drug de-
pendency and substance abuse problems and need treatment for these
issues.132  Drug courts are an interesting new approach that is steadily
growing and is specifically designed to help drug offenders.133  In
1989, the first drug court was created in Miami-Dade County with the
mission to provide a treatment alternative to incarceration for nonvio-
lent drug users facing criminal charges.134  There are varying models
of these specialized court-based programs, but most comprehensive
models involve offender assessment, judicial interaction, monitoring
and supervision, graduated sanctions and incentives, and treatment
services.135
Channeling eligible defendants who are struggling drug addicts into
treatment rather than the prison system is a much better use of re-
sources, particularly if the treatment is successful.136  As of June 2012,
the number of drug courts had reached over 2,700 and were present in
every U.S. state and territory.137  Research concerning the effective-
ness of these drug courts is constantly being generated, but reports
have been positive thus far.138  Studies show that drug court graduates
have a lower recidivism rate than offenders generally.139  The costs
that are avoided by keeping these individuals out of prison are not
130. Why Should I Care?, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, http://
famm.org/the-facts/#the cost (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Why Should I
Care?]; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED 5 (2012) [hereinafter Time
Served].
131. Why Should I Care?, supra note 130; TIME SERVED, supra note 130, at 130.
132. See generally GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 125.
133. See DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PRO-
FESSIONALS, RESEARCH UPDATE ON ADULT DRUG COURTS 1–2 (2010); RYAN S.
KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE 1 (2009).
134. KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 133, at 1.
135. See id.
136. Harris, supra note 13, at 446 (“According to the Rand Corporation,
‘[t]reatment of substance abusers is eight to nine times more cost-effective than long
sentences.’”).
137. About NADCP, NATIONALL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS,
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/about-nadcp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
138. See KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 133, at 19.
139. MARLOWE, supra note 133, at 1–2.
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insignificant and should at least encourage the consideration of in-
creasing the availability of the programs.140
Time has proven that guaranteed harsh sentences have little deter-
rent effect on drug offenders.141  Traditional punishment theories, like
retribution in particular, tend to be less effective for drug offenders.142
There must be a more effective and cost-efficient way to address low-
level, nonviolent drug offenders that focuses on treatment and reha-
bilitation.143  It may be too soon to know the limitations of drug
courts, but development of these programs or similar alternatives to
incarceration may be a viable option for combating this culture of in-
carceration.144  Even if only a portion of drug offenders are candidates
for or will benefit from treatment, it would be a more effective ap-
proach to stop treating all drug offenders as equal.145  Unacceptable
incarceration levels require that the sentencing system evaluate treat-
ment and imprisonment as distinctly separate options for drug
offenders.
IV. PAST ATTEMPTS TO REFORM
For as long as the prison population has been a concern, people
have made or have attempted to make changes to reduce the bur-
den.146  Changes are constantly being proposed from many different
directions.147  However, the recent changes seem to be marginal ad-
justments and current proposals seem to take the same timid ap-
proach.  By looking at past actions taken to reform this atrocious
140. KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 133, at 8.
141. VALERIE WRIGHT, SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT (Nov. 2010), available
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf.
142. See Mascharka, supra note 13, at 948–49.
143. For example, “75% of Drug Court graduates remain arrest-free at least two
years after leaving the program,” and every $1 invested saves taxpayers “as much as
$3.36 in avoided criminal justice costs alone.” Quick Facts, FAMILIES AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS, http://famm.org/the-facts-with-sources/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2014).
144. In 2012, only 10% of all federal offenders “received probation or home con-
finement.” Id. Increased availability of drug court programs should increase the pos-
sibility of offenders qualifying for alternatives to imprisonment.
145. See MAUER & KING, supra note 9, at 14–18.
146. See William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-
Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 307 (2011); Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A.
Levin, Conservatives Welcome Eric Holder to the Criminal-Justice-Reform Band-
wagon, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.nationalreview.
com/node/355661/; Anthony Papa, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing and Potential
Pardons by President Obama, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/anthony-papa/serving-15-to-life-under-_b_3806933.html.
147. See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, Bipartisan Bill to Reform Mandatory Minimums
Introduced in U.S. House, DAILY CHRONIC (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.thedaily
chronic.net/2013/26097/bipartisan-bill-reform-mandatory-minimums-introduced-u-s-
house/; see also Reddy & Levin, supra note 146.
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system, it should be apparent that similar incremental changes will not
produce the necessary relief.148
A. Legislative Adjustments
As the harsh effects of the mandatory minimum sentences attached
to drug offenses have become increasingly difficult to ignore, Con-
gress has begun to take remedial action.  Although the remedies have
produced real, positive results for those benefitting from the adjust-
ments or exceptions, a problem of this magnitude demands a much
bolder reformation in order to make a crucial difference.149  This sys-
tem needs changes that will affect the whole rather than scattered
individuals.
1. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
In light of the harsh consequences of the mandatory minimums for
low-level drug offenders, Congress began considering changes, and
the safety valve was introduced.150  Despite popular support for re-
form, proposed minimum-sentence exemptions for low-level, nonvio-
lent offenders failed.151  Instead, Congress passed the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act in 1994, incorporating a safety
valve provision permitting judges to depart from the mandatory mini-
mums for some eligible low-level, nonviolent drug offenders.152
The safety valve aimed to excuse drug offenders from the applicable
mandatory minimum sentence in specific circumstances.153  Judges
could now disregard the mandatory minimum and determine a sen-
tence based on the applicable sentencing guidelines if the defendant
fit the following criteria: no more than one criminal history point;154
unarmed and nonviolent during the offense; did not cause death or
serious injury during the offense; not a leader or engaged in criminal
enterprise; and provided all the information he or she had regarding
the offense to the Government.155  If the defendant met all these re-
148. See Siebert, supra note 5, at 911–12.
149. Id. at 911 (“Left with a system in which the executive is functionally inept,
Congress is too politically frightened to take action, and . . . the current sentencing
laws have taken on a lifeless form gasping for breath.”).
150. 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 34.
151. See id. at 34–35.
152. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-322, § 80001,
108 Stat. 1796, 1985–86 (1994).
153. § 80001(a).
154. Id.; see also USSG MANUAL, supra note 26, at 369.  Defendants are assigned
criminal history points according to § 4A1.1 for prior criminal history.  The total num-
ber of points determines the defendant’s criminal history category, which is used to
calculate what sentence should be imposed for the current charge.
155. § 80001.
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quirements, a judge could sentence according to the guideline, which
was specifically amended to provide for this situation.156
The safety valve may appear effective in limiting mandatory mini-
mum sentencing, but it was essentially a compromise in an otherwise
unsuccessful proposal.157  But instead of directly exempting a certain
class of offenders from the mandatory minimums, Congress merely
created an exception for individuals.158
2. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) to allevi-
ate the unnecessary harshness of some mandatory minimum drug
sentences.159  The FSA particularly targeted the absurd disparity that
existed between the amounts of powder and crack cocaine possession
necessary to trigger mandatory minimum sentences.160  The powder-
cocaine-to-crack-cocaine ratio was 100:1, meaning that, while a defen-
dant charged with possession of crack cocaine could be subject to a
mandatory ten-year sentence, a defendant who possessed powder co-
caine would need 100-times more drugs to be subject to the same
mandatory ten-year sentence.161  While not absurd for drugs to have
different triggering quantities based on dangerousness, this disparity
was extreme for two drugs with the same chemical composition.162
Furthermore, because such small amounts of crack cocaine triggered
the mandatory sentences, severe penalties impacted low-level offend-
ers more often than high-level drug traffickers or kingpins.163
The FSA’s reform of the disparate sentencing for powder and crack
cocaine was long-awaited, and the Commission had been making rec-
ommendations for years before this first step toward closing the gap
was successful.164  While it did not entirely eliminate the disparity, the
FSA reduced the difference in the triggering quantities to 18:1.165  The
FSA itself was progress, but the act was not expressly retroactive.166
In order to provide justice for as many people as possible, advocates
156. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY,
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 49 (May 2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/200705_RtC_Co-
caine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf [hereinafter 2007 REPORT].
157. See Oliss, supra note 61, at 1882–84.
158. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 156, at 49.
159. Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 960).
160. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
161. Sarah Hyser, Comment, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: How Federal
Courts Took the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV.
503, 509 (2012).
162. See id. at 509–10.
163. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 156, at 7–8.
164. 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 29–31.
165. See Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 960).
166. Oliss, supra note 61, at 1884.
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for retroactivity pressed on until Congress finally decided that the new
rules applied to all defendants awaiting sentencing when the FSA was
passed.167  The passage of this Act and its retroactive application per-
mitted many people to avoid the unduly harsh mandatory minimum
sentencing.168  This marked an important victory in the pursuit of a
more just sentencing system, but it far from solved the problem.169
The FSA fortunately afforded many defendants a less severe sen-
tence, but mandatory minimums still send low-level drug offenders to
prison for long sentences determined by the type of drug involved.170
The adjustment greatly benefits those who actually receive reduced
punishments, but it does not necessarily follow that the adjustment
will help alleviate the overall problem of over-incarceration.  Counter-
intuitively, drug offenders continue to face the harsh mandatory
sentences until they are granted the exception, whereas the sentencing
scheme should default them at the lower level and subject them to
harsher sentences only when it would reflect their culpability.
3. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013
The Smarter Sentencing Act (“SSA”), a bipartisan bill, was intro-
duced into both houses of Congress in 2013.171  Similar to the FSA,
this bill would reduce the actual sentence lengths in the mandatory
minimum statutes.172  The SSA’s purpose is “to focus limited Federal
resources on the most serious offenders,” and it will do so by cutting
down the sentences required in the Controlled Substances Act and
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act.173
Along with reducing the mandatory sentence lengths, the bill also
provides more leniency concerning criminal history points necessary
167. Maya Rhodan, Obama Expands Mandatory Minimum Relief, TIME (Sept. 20,
2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/09/20/obama-expands-mandatory-minimum-
sentencing-relief/; Memorandum to All Fed. Prosecutors, Deputy Attorney Gen.
Gary G. Grindler (Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/fair-
sentencing-act-memo.pdf; Memorandum to All Fed. Prosecutors, Attorney Gen. Eric
H. Holder, Jr. (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.fpd-ohn.org/sites/default/files/
files/Holder%20FSA%20memo%207_15_11(1).pdf.
168. See Dan Zeidman, A Call for Fairness, ACLU (June 29, 2011, 1:03 PM), https:
//www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/call-fairness; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
PRELIMINARY CRACK RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT: FAIR SENTENCING ACT
(2013).
169. See generally Nauman, supra note 84, at 867.
170. 2012 REPORT, supra note 37, at 46, 51.  In 2010, half of the drug offenders who
were convicted of an offense with a mandatory minimum were convicted of one carry-
ing a ten-year sentence. Id.
171. Smarter Sentencing Act, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2013) (sponsored by Democrat
Richard Durbin and Republican Mike Lee); Smarter Sentencing Act, H.R. 3382,
113th Cong. (2013) (sponsored by Republican Raul Labrador and Democrat Bobby
Scott).
172. S. 1410; H.R. 3382.
173. See S. 1410 § 4; H.R. 3382 § 4.
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before the mandatory sentence is applicable.174  In light of these
changes, the Commission would be required to amend their guidelines
to be consistent with the decreased penalty terms.175  Finally, the At-
torney General would then be able to report on the effectiveness of
federal criminal justice spending in light of cost savings and their alle-
viation of inmate overcrowding, any increased investment in law en-
forcement, and reductions in recidivism rates.176  This bill has
garnered modest support and carries an estimated 39% chance of
enactment.177
4. Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013
The Justice Safety Valve Act (“JSVA”), also a bipartisan bill, was
introduced in both houses of Congress in 2013.178  The purpose of this
bill is “to amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent unjust and
irrational criminal punishments,” and would do so by increasing the
safety valve available for judges when they feel it is appropriate to
avoid mandatory minimum sentences.179
The suggested amendment adds a provision at the end of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 granting judges the authority to sentence below a mandatory
minimum statute to prevent unjust punishment.180  The provision re-
quires that the court notify parties of any intent to sentence below the
minimum so that they may respond and that the court must make a
written statement explaining the factors that made the lower sentence
necessary.181  This bill has gained some attention but only has an esti-
mated 12%–16% chance of enactment.182
Creating another safety valve is just another way to increase the
exceptions that apply to an unnecessary rule.  It seems that increasing
exceptions is tantamount to acknowledging that the statutory punish-
ment is not always appropriate and thus should not be discretionary.
Allowing judges the ability to discern when harsh mandatory
sentences are unwarranted might avoid some of the most tragic conse-
quences, but Congress should more directly address the problem by
174. S. 1410 § 2; H.R. 3382 § 2.
175. S. 1410 § 5; H.R. 3382 § 5.
176. S. 1410 § 6; H.R. 3382 § 6.
177. Civic Impulse, LLC, S. 1410: Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US,
(Sept. 15, 2014, 5:05 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410#overview.
178. Justice Safety Valve Act, S. 619, 113th Cong. (2013) (introduced by Republican
Rand Paul and Democrat Patrick Leahy); Justice Safety Valve Act, H.R. 1695, 113th
Cong. (2013) (introduced by Democrat Bobby Scott and Republican Thomas Massie).
179. S. 619; H.R. 1695.
180. S. 619 § 2; H.R. 1695 § 2.
181. S. 619 § 2; H.R. 1695 § 2.
182. Civic Impulse, LLC, S. 619: Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US,
(Feb. 23, 2014, 4:31 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s619#overview;
Civic Impulse, LLC, H.R. 1695: Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, (Feb.
23, 2014, 4:31 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1695#overview.
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repealing the mandatory minimums rather than create more excep-
tions to the rule.
5. Major Drug Trafficking Prosecution Act of 2013
The Major Drug Trafficking Prosecution Act (“MDTPA”) was in-
troduced to the House of Representatives by Democrat Maxine Wa-
ters in 2013.183  The purpose of the act is “to concentrate federal
resources aimed at the prosecution of drug offenses on those offenses
that are major,” listing multiple congressional findings concerning
mandatory minimums, disparate sentencing, severity of punishment
for drug offenses, and costs of incarceration.184
Specific proposals of this bill are to require written Attorney Gen-
eral approval before prosecuting an offender under the Controlled
Substances Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act
if the amount of the substance is less than the amount specified in the
statute.185  Written approval would also be required to prosecute an
offender for substances containing cocaine or cocaine base if the
amount is less than 500 grams, ensuring that resources are better ex-
pended punishing major traffickers.186  Most significantly, the bill pro-
poses amending the Controlled Substances Act and Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act to remove all mandatory minimum
sentence provisions.187
The MDTPA directly addresses the problems stemming from
mandatory minimum sentences for low-level drug offenders but un-
fortunately lacks strong support.188  Not only does the bill have an
estimated 1% chance of being enacted, but Waters has proposed it
three previous times since 1999, each time failing to push it through
the congressional committee.189
B. Executive Adjustments
Although most of the mandatory minimum reform debate takes
place in the legislature, the executive branch plays a role in the strug-
gle as well.190  Attorneys general have participated through directives
for federal prosecutors concerning mandatory minimums, and the cur-





188. Civic Impulse, LLC, H.R. 3088: Major Drug Trafficking Prosecution Act of
2013, GOVTRACK.US, (Feb. 22, 2014, 3:38 PM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
113/hr3088#overview; H.R. 2303, 112th Cong. (2011).
189. Id.; H.R. 1466, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1978, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1681,
106th Cong. (1999).
190. Siebert, supra note 5, at 881.
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rent Attorney General is certainly active.191  Mandatory minimum
sentences deprive judges of discretion, but there has always been an
opportunity for prosecutorial discretion to affect sentencing though
charging.192  For at least the last twenty years, Department of Justice
attorneys have admitted to exercising that discretion by not charging
mandatory minimums in every case where the facts support them.193
1. Past Attorneys General Announcements
Mandatory minimum sentencing has been complicated for as long
as it has been in place.194  Particularly, the use of these sentences has
been at issue with nonviolent drug offenses and also in determining
when it is appropriate to apply the harsh prison sentences.  It has been
common for the Attorney General to issue directives for federal pros-
ecutors concerning the implementation of a specific policy.195
In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a memo introducing a
policy that would have prosecutors make their charging decisions
based on “an individualized assessment of the extent to which particu-
lar charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent
with the purposes of the federal criminal code, and maximize the im-
pact of federal resources on crime.”196  This policy directive essentially
allowed prosecutors to use their own discretion when deciding
whether a defendant should be subject to a mandatory minimum for
nonviolent drug crimes.197
Then, in 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued another
memo to federal prosecutors.  Ashcroft’s memo explicitly stated that
it superseded any previously issued policy directives.198  The new in-
structions required federal prosecutors to charge the most serious and
readily provable offense in all cases.199  Exceptions to the rule pro-
vided that a prosecutor was not required to pursue the most serious
offense if: (1) the sentence length would not be affected; (2) the case
was a part of a fast track program authorized by the Attorney Gen-
eral; (3) a post-indictment reassessment shows that the offense is no
longer readily provable; (4) the defendant has provided substantial as-
sistance; or (5) if a statutory enhancement would not be practical.200
191. See Alan Vinegrad, Justice Department’s New Charging, Plea Bargaining and
Sentencing Policy, 243 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2010).
192. 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 96–97.
193. 1991 REPORT, supra note 6, at 103.
194. See Harris, supra note 13, at 440–41.
195. Vinegrad, supra note 191.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Memorandum to All Fed. Prosecutors, Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft (Sept.
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However, these exceptions required the written or documented senior
attorney approval.201  Also, any downward departures for sentencing
that a prosecutor conceded must be disclosed to the court so they
could be recorded.202  Ashcroft focused on protecting honesty in sen-
tencing and treating defendants with fairness and consistency, stating:
“Just as the sentence a defendant receives should not depend upon
which particular judge presides over the case, so too the charges a
defendant faces should not depend upon the particular prosecutor as-
signed to handle the case.”203
While the policy determinations from the Attorney General do not
change the law or applicable sentences, they can significantly alter
how the laws are used against defendants.204  Prosecutors retain tre-
mendous control over the ultimate punishment of a defendant in the
face of applicable mandatory minimums because charges brought
against a defendant already have a minimum sentence attached.205
Prosecutors may exercise the sort of discretion that Congress intended
mandatory minimums to supersede.206
The directives also demonstrate how the focus of the criminal jus-
tice system can shift at certain times.  Attorney General Reno focused
on carefully determining whether a defendant was deserving of a
lengthy prison sentence through “individual assessments.”207  How-
ever, Attorney General Ashcroft shifted that focus back to applying
the laws as strictly and uniformly as possible.208
2. Current Attorneys General Announcements
Although Ashcroft shifted focus away from the “individual assess-
ment” directed by his predecessor Reno, he would be overruled by
the next policy directive.  In 2010 Attorney General Eric Holder sent
a memo reinstating the “individual assessment” for determining
whether mandatory minimum sentences fit the circumstances, were
consistent with the federal code, and maximized resources.209
Then, in 2013, Alleyne v. United States established that for
mandatory minimums or additional enhancements to be applicable
the prosecutor had to include them as elements in the charge.210  The
Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the statutory
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the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”211  This requirement
bolsters the prosecutor’s control over sentencing.212  With the discre-
tion of federal prosecutors once again centrally operative, Holder has
issued another memo directing their focus.213
In order to reduce the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences
for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders, Holder has refocused the
charging policy.214  In drug crimes based on type or quantity, prosecu-
tors will continue to use “individualized assessments” to determine
what charges are appropriate and, if certain criteria are met, decline to
charge the defendant with the amount that would trigger the
mandatory sentence.215  The prosecutor should decline to charge the
triggering quantity if the defendant meets all of the following:  (1) the
defendant’s conduct did not involve violence, credible threats, weap-
ons, minors, death or serious injury; (2) defendant is not an organizer,
leader, manager or supervisor in a criminal organization; (3) defen-
dant does not have significant ties to organized drug trafficking, gangs,
or cartels; and (4) defendant does not have a significant criminal
history.216
Along with instructions to be more critical before applying
mandatory minimum sentences, Holder has pushed for sentencing re-
form.217  In August 2013, Holder spoke before the American Bar As-
sociation calling for “sweeping, systemic change” to the judicial
system.218  Holder stated that the Obama Administration plans to
cease filing charges that carry mandatory minimums against nonvio-
lent and non-gang-affiliated drug offenders, subject to the criteria de-
fined in the charging policy.219
While talks of major reform are gaining much attention, Holder has
not acted alone in his efforts to spark a movement.220  President Ba-
rack Obama has not only supported Holder’s call for sentencing re-
form but also has acted to remedy injustices in drug sentencing.221  In
December 2013, President Obama issued thirteen pardons and com-
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muted sentences for eight people serving long sentences for drug of-
fenses.222  The defendants whose sentences were commuted had
already served over fifteen years, and some of those pardoned had
already completed their harsh mandatory sentences.223
Attorney General Holder’s change in federal prosecutors’ policies
is a step in the right direction, but it does not amount to real change
absent more concrete actions.224  The new charging policy signifies a
decision to enforce the law more prudently, but it should not be misin-
terpreted as anything more than a change in attitude.225  Any step to-
ward a fair and just sentencing system should not be discounted, but
as long prison sentences are being blithely imposed there is still a long
way to go.
C. Proposed Adjustments
Throughout years of debate over federal sentencing reform, a num-
ber of scholarly articles have proposed a variety of different ap-
proaches that typically focus on three different aspects: (1) returning
to an emphasis on discretion;226 (2) strengthening the exceptions so
that unintended consequences may be more consistently avoided;227
and (3) moving away from mandatory sentences and towards imple-
mentation of well-drafted guidelines.228
Proponents of the safety valve intended it to herald an important
step towards a better sentencing system, but some criticize it as too
narrow.229  Even those in favor of an improved or expanded safety
valve agree the current exceptions clearly fall short of making a signif-
icant impact.230  To secure fairer sentences for low-level drug offend-
ers, one proposed amendment to the safety valve provision would
expand the statutory definition of low-level offenders from the cur-
rently narrow scope of eligibility requirements.231  If a judge deter-
mined that a particular defendant met a sufficient number of factors,
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then the safety valve would apply and the judge could forego the
mandatory sentence and sentence according to the guidelines.232
While an expansion of the safety valve or other exception would
surely make fairer sentences available to more offenders, approaches
of this type fail to address the real issue.  First, unless eliminated out-
right, mandatory sentences would continue  looming unnecessarily
over every offender. Second, mandatory sentences and Congress’s
past directives for harsh sentencing continue to infect the guidelines,
requiring the judge to nevertheless impose a sentence likely longer
than necessary.
Proposed reforms commonly focus on restoring discretion within
the sentencing system but vary in whether that discretion would be
most efficient in the hands of judges or prosecutors.  Approaches that
focus on judicial discretion seem to include a restriction or repeal of
mandatory sentences and the continued existence of advisory guide-
lines.233  Because the guidelines are advisory, judicial discretion will
undoubtedly factor into whether mandatory sentences are repealed.234
Nevertheless, the state of the guidelines should play a more central
role in determining the necessity of comprehensive revision.  Accord-
ingly, judicial discretion is a component of the solution but cannot
stand alone as the solution.
On the other hand, approaches focusing on prosecutorial discretion
are based on the continued prominence of mandatory sentences.235
Proposals suggest that reforming prosecutorial practices for fairness,
rationality, and consistency will make sentencing more efficient.236  If
the mandatory sentences must continue to be an integral part of the
system, then this approach may be appropriate. However, mandatory
sentences should not be a necessary concession in forming a solution.
Increasing prosecutors’ discretion in selecting whom shall remain sub-
ject to mandatory sentences is a precarious solution in an adversarial
criminal justice system.
Many proposals suggest that the necessary approach to finding a
solution requires abandoning mandatory minimum statutes to allow
the guidelines to serve their original purposes.  However, proposals
that suggest scrapping the mandatory sentences entirely usually in-
clude an alternative of limiting their presence, perhaps because full
repeal seems too radical.237  Complete repeal of the mandatory
sentences in drug offenses is often mentioned as a possibility or re-
quest while focusing on the role of the Commission.238  One scholar
232. Id.
233. Nauman, supra note 84, at 883–84; Harris, supra note 13, at 448–50.
234. Nauman, supra note 84, at 884.
235. Id. at 884–89; Simon, supra note 204, at 387.
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discusses the original directives given to the Commission in the SRA
and suggests that implementing those directives may be enough to ef-
fectuate change.239
Another scholar focuses on the Commission and other qualified ex-
perts taking control of sentencing policies, but the discussion does not
clearly address what steps would be taken at the outset.240  Other pro-
posals include amending the guidelines and combating over-politiciza-
tion by keeping Congress out of the Commission’s work.241  While the
Commission taking control of the sentencing system and its policies is
a major component, it will lack the power to effectively reform with-
out repeal of mandatory minimum sentences.242  In order to address
the current issues of prison overcrowding and deficient budgets, re-
form must come soon but will only remain hindered as long as the
harsh sentencing laws remain in effect.
V. MEANINGFUL CHANGE
The mandatory minimum sentencing system has had negative impli-
cations since its inception.243  This negative impact has been most
damaging through the application of mandatory minimums in drug of-
fenses.244  Since Congress began attaching long mandatory sentences
to these offenses, drug offenders have filled American prisons.245
Many of the inmates behind bars because of these overly harsh
sentences were convicted of low-level, nonviolent drug crimes.246  But
this problem has become so acute that it threatens to devastate on a
national level if something is not done soon.247  “From the White
House to Congress, there is a growing consensus that mandatory mini-
mums are an abject failure, wasting billions of tax dollars and destroy-
ing communities,” said Jasmine Tyler of the Drug Policy Alliance.248
There is nothing new about the suggestion that reforms need to be
made to the sentencing system or drug offense sentencing in particu-
lar, but efforts are too minor to make the sort of impact that is desper-
239. Price, supra note 65, at 92–93 (“There are several directives embedded in the
criminal code by the SRA that have lain dormant or been underutilized.  If dusted off
and taken seriously, these directives could arm the Sentencing Commission with
enough authority to address some of the worst problems with guideline sentences.”).
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ately needed.249  Instead of adjusting the length of mandatory terms,
reducing triggering quantity disparities, creating loopholes, and shift-
ing policy directives, the system itself needs comprehensive change or
society will suffer and resources will dwindle.
A. Abolish Mandatory Minimums in Drug Offenses Immediately
Considering that mandatory minimum sentences have failed to pro-
duce expected results, it is likely in the best interest of the criminal
justice system to abandon them entirely.250  Such a significant leap re-
quires time and carefully calculated actions but should not be brushed
aside.  In the meantime, prison overcrowding and deficit budgets re-
main an immediate concern.251  Because almost 50% of the prison
population is serving sentences for drug offenses, that area of law is in
foremost need of a direct and effective action.252
The sentencing system as a whole is over-complex and difficult to
use, but mandatory minimums in drug offenses have clearly proved
ineffective and must be discontinued.253  This harsh sentencing
scheme is funneling far too many people into prison for drug offenses
to serve mandatory minimum sentences that lawmakers should eradi-
cate immediately to alleviate their crippling costs.254  While the Com-
mission refines the sentencing guidelines for drug offenses, judges and
prosecutors must be trusted to use their discretion in punishing de-
fendants with appropriate and warranted sentences.255  Because the
guidelines were written to reflect the mandatory minimums, the sen-
tencing guidelines for all drug offenses will need to be entirely
restructured.256
B. Reevaluate the Current Prison Population and Budget
Prison should be reserved for those most deserving of the punish-
ment and those least fit to be in the community.257  An important fac-
tor in sentencing policy is that federal resources should be used where
most necessary.258  Subjecting low-level drug offenders to long prison
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sentences does not necessarily serve a vital purpose.259  The current
prison population should be assessed to identify individuals who are
not a threat to society and would greatly benefit from a rehabilitation-
focused program.260  Instead of allocating resources to incarcerate
drug offenders, budgets could be reassessed in order to provide more
funds for drug courts, community programs, and rehabilitation.261  Re-
moving the least culpable offenders from the prison system and com-
mitting them instead to treatment programs would free up funding for
more effective uses and would afford the offender a greater chance of
recovery.262
Of course, not all drug offenders should avoid incarceration and the
most serious or dangerous drug offenders should be the focus of law
enforcement and prosecutors.  Long prison sentences are appropriate
for some offenders, but sentencing guidelines need restructuring to
reflect that not all drug crimes are equal.263
C. A “New” Federal Sentencing System
Congress acted impulsively when it rushed into establishing
mandatory minimums after it had just produced a well-designed, in-
sightful plan for sentencing.264  The Sentencing Commission had just
been created but had not been given the chance to carry out their
assigned tasks.265  If mandatory minimums could be wholly revoked
along with the instructions from Congress to have the guidelines re-
flect those mandatory sentences, then the sentencing system originally
proposed in the SRA would be a viable solution.266  The Commission
is entirely capable of creating the fair, effective sentencing guidelines
envisioned in 1984.267  As it has been fulfilling its responsibilities to
evaluate and review sentencing practices and data, as well as analyzing
259. Studies do not conclusively show that mandatory minimums effectively reduce
drug activity, but reports instead show steady increases in the number of drug offend-
ers arrested and the amount of drugs seized each year.  Harris, supra note 13, at 443.
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the downfalls of mandatory minimums, the Commission would be
able to not only address the most problematic areas quickly but also
refine the entire system over time.268
The Commission has been often criticized for overly harsh
sentences, but Congress has been directing it to update the guidelines
to reflect the statutory minimums.269  The Commission should start at
the fundamentals and ensure a consistent, fair, and effective system.270
Because the Commission knows what does not work, it is more than
equipped to succeed.  Moreover, now that the sentencing guidelines
are advisory, unintended consequences previously experienced should
prove easier to avoid.271
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal sentencing system of the last few decades has not been
particularly successful and the exponential growth of the prison popu-
lation has been creating a culture of mass incarceration.272  In addition
to housing a disproportionately large number of prisoners, the federal
government has also poured an astonishing amount of money into in-
carceration, and the costs continue to rise every year.273  Regrettably,
a large portion of this massive growth in the federal prison system is
attributable to the proclaimed “war on drugs.”274  Regardless of the
legitimacy of this “war on drugs”, it is disconcerting that such a large
portion of incarcerated drug offenders are low-level offenders, rather
than major traffickers or kingpins.275  Recently, Attorney General
Holder caught everyone’s attention by advocating for sentencing re-
form and instituting federal charging policies that permit avoidance of
268. The Commission submitted a report to Congress in 2011 focused on the impact
of mandatory minimums, including chapters specifically addressing drug offenses.
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mandatory minimums.276  But this charging policy is a temporary di-
rective and, unless Congress makes substantive changes to the law,
Holder’s campaign for reform is just a campaign.277
In Holder’s words: “Although incarceration has a role to play in our
justice system, widespread incarceration at the federal, state and local
levels is both ineffective and unsustainable.”278  The structure of this
broken sentencing system needs to be radically and comprehensively
simplified by ending the use of mandatory minimum statutes.279  Fur-
thermore, immediate action would alleviate prison overcrowding and
deficit budgets.280  The Sentencing Commission, which from the outset
Congress buried underneath mandatory minimums, needs the oppor-
tunity to wipe the slate clean and begin functioning as originally in-
tended.  The necessary components for restructuring the sentencing
system for efficiency and intended purpose already exist, but this bro-
ken system will continue to cause more damage until the proper au-
thorities receive the power to do so.
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